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 1 
Failing to Protect the Vulnerable: The Dangers of Institutional Complicity and 
Enablers 
 
Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!1 
 
                                        
                                         Professor Amos N. Guiora2 
 
Abstract 
Criminal liability has typically been reserved for those who have both actus reus 
and mens rea. Omission liability is infrequent in modern criminal codes. Despite wide 
public support for aiding those in peril, Western democracies have historically 
refused to impose any penalty upon those who fail to aid someone in danger. 
However recent high profile abuse scandals—including those of the USA gymnastics 
team, University of Michigan and the Catholic Church have caused scholars and 
policymakers to rethink these assumptions. In recent years, some jurisdictions have 
 
1 Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” POETRY FOUNDATION (1883), 
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46550/the-new-colossus. 
2 Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I owe many thanks to Eric 
Thorne (SJ Quinney, JD expected 2022) whose significant contributions to this article are deeply 
appreciated, to Joe Stroud and Clare Leaney from the In Good Faith Foundation (Australia) for 
their very helpful and honest feedback, and to my friend and colleague Professor/Associate 
Dean Shima Baughman for her encouragement and wise counsel. I also wish to thank a number of 
anonymous readers who graciously commented and provided invaluable feedback; one reader 
correctly noted the inherent challenges of imposing a bystander requirement in minority 
communities where there is inherent suspicion of law enforcement. Another reader expressed 
concerns over anonymity in reporting. These are both very valid concerns which cannot be 
addressed by this article alone. This article is part of a larger project initially undertaken when 
my book, Crime of Complicity: The Bystander in the Holocaust, was published in 2017. In its 
aftermath, a second book, Armies of Enablers: Survivor Stories of Complicity and Betrayal in Sexual 
Assaults, was published September 2020. Furthermore, a co-authored law review article (with 
Jessie Dyer), “Bystander Legislation: He Ain’t Heavy, He’s My Brother,” was published, September 
2020. A third co-authored (Jon Vaughn) book, tentatively entitled, Piercing the Veil: The Myth of 
the Michigan Man, addresses the culture of enabling at the University of Michigan. In addition, I 
have been involved in legislative efforts regarding the criminalization of the bystander and 
enabler in a number of states, particularly in Utah where I have worked closely with State 
Representative Brian King. 
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slowly come to criminalize those who witness another in peril and fail to provide 
aid. However, governments remain silent on whether to punish actors not present, 
but who learn of ongoing peril to someone they have power to protect, but 
nevertheless choose to not act on their behalf. Indeed, unlike other threats to society, 
no legislation currently exists to effectively criminalize these enablers of crime. 
What is more, the failure of governments to recognize omission as a crime has 
directly led to the phenomenon of institutional complicity. Institutional complicity, as 
defined in this Article, is where an individual turns a blind eye to abuse out of a 
sense of duty to an institution. This Article proposes a legal framework and 
definitional language to allow prosecution of actors who discover sexual assault, 
and yet fail to contact law enforcement. It also distinguishes between enables and 
bystanders of crime and facilitates the consideration of these issues of omission by 
legislatures. 
In examining the issue from the perspective of the person in peril, the article 
provides a path towards more effectively redressing the harms suffered by crime 
victims. 
I. Preface 
 
What is society?  
 
What duties does the state owe the public?  
 
What duties do we owe each other? 
 
What is worth protecting? 
 
Who is worth protecting? 
 
These questions have been at the forefront of philosophical discourse for centuries; 
they have been the subject of an endless litany of books, articles, arguments, and 
wars. These questions are at the core of the human existence. And yet, answers 
today are as shrouded in uncertainty, debate, and murkiness as they were when 
confronted by the ancient Hebrews and Greeks. There is a sense of revisiting, 
reexamining, restating, and rearguing in even raising these questions. The 
expression “been there, done that” comes to mind, like a rerun of a movie watched 
decades ago.  
 
Notwithstanding extraordinary progress greatly benefitting broad segments of 
society, there is an issue that demands our attention. It is an issue we have failed to 
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compellingly address, the question being: what duty do bystanders and enablers 
owe the person in peril? It is a dilemma that has proved perplexing to resolve; a 
variety of reasons have been proffered to explain this moral and legal gap. 
 
While debate may be healthy under some circumstances, failing to impose a duty 
to act on bystanders and enablers has one practical result: it ensures perpetrators 
can act with confidence knowing those positioned to provide assistance to the victim 
have no obligation to do so. That results in the abandonment of the person in peril; 
it is their voice that we must hear when examining bystander-enabler duty to act. 
 
II. Introduction 
 
On the face of it, in an enlightened society providing assistance to the person in 
peril should be, for lack of a better word, obvious.3 However, examples abound of 
individuals who, for various reasons, turn a blind eye to those in distress. That is 
particularly the case when sexual assault occurs in an institution and institutional 
actors protect the institution, rather than the person in peril. Examples are 
everywhere to be found in the Catholic Church,4 Michigan State University,5 
Pennsylvania State University,6 USA Gymnastics,7 Ohio State University,8 and the 
University of Michigan.9 The mind-numbing repetitiveness is extraordinary. The 
complicity-defining institutional actors casting their die with the institution 
continuously exacerbates the peril of the person to whom a primary duty of care 
must be owed. Their failure to act must be understood as a crime of omission. 
 
 
3 Ken Levy, Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 607, 612-14 
(2010). 
4 Allegations of child sex abuse by Roman Catholic clergy has skyrocketed in recent years. Michelle Boorstein, 
Scandals, compensation programs lead Catholic clergy sex abuse complaints to quadruple in 2019, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (June 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2020/06/26/scandals-compensation-programs-
lead-catholic-clergy-sex-abuse-complaints-quadruple-2019/. The details of a sex abuse coverup will be outlined 
later in this article.     
5 Multiple investigations have unearthed a definite “rape culture” at MSU where survivors are discouraged from 
brining claims—especially against football and basketball players—and investigating authorities refuse to press 
charges. Lindsay Gibbs, It’s not just Larry Nassar: Michigan State University has a problem with rape culture, THINK 
PROGRESS (Aug. 27, 2019), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/years-after-larry-nassar-michigan-state-universitys-
rape-culture-persists-d3c62ed1f567/. 
6 Bill Chappell, Penn State Abuse Scandal: A Guide And Timeline, NPR (June 21, 2012), 
https://www.npr.org/2011/11/08/142111804/penn-state-abuse-scandal-a-guide-and-timeline. 
7 In January 2018, 156 women gave victim impact statements at the sentencing of Dr. Larry Nassar, stating they had 
been abused by him—sometimes hundreds of times—under the guise of medical treatment. Many accused USAG of 
ignoring, dismissing, or minimalizing their claims of abuse and otherwise failing to protect them. Eric Levenson, Larry 
Nassar sentenced to up to 175 years in prison for decades of sexual abuse, CNN (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/us/larry-nassar-sentencing/index.html. 
8 Billy Witz, Ohio State Pays $41 Million to Settle Claims From Doctor’s Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/08/sports/ohio-state-strauss-settlement.html. 
9 Kim Kozlowski, How UM failed for decades to heed warnings about doctor's alleged sex abuse, THE DETROIT NEWS (Oct. 
22, 2020), https://www.detroitnews.com/in-depth/news/local/michigan/2020/10/21/how-university-michigan-
failed-doctor-robert-anderson-alleged-sex-abuse/4894925002/. 
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Examples abound, stories are recounted endlessly, survivors are in abundance, and 
scars—physical and emotional—are deep and entrenched. We must individually 
and collectively say, “enough is enough.” It is what we owe those harmed twice: 
initially by the perpetrator, then by those who made the decision to ignore and 
diminish the harm. It is a two-fold trauma; for many survivors, the inaction of the 
bystander-enabler is more profound than the action of the perpetrator.10  
 
Ignoring this reality accentuates the peril. While there is no doubt regarding the 
harm caused by the perpetrator, our focus is on a broader issue, going well beyond 
the so-called common criminal. What we shall examine is the actor who decided not 
to protect the vulnerable, thereby enabling the perpetrator. The decision to not act 
on behalf of the person in peril equates to acting on behalf of the perpetrator. 
From the perspective of the endangered individual, the enabler has, in essence, 
supported the perpetrator. A wall surrounds the perpetrator, rather than protecting 
the person most in need of protection.  
 
The theme of the wall is particularly relevant when we consider the crime of 
omission in an institutional context; complicity is at its core.11 Complicity can run 
deep within institutions; it is embedded, institutionalized, and pervasive. It creates a 
culture whereby the perpetrator is guaranteed protection and enablers understand 
their primary obligation is to protect the institution rather than the individual in peril.  
 
This wall has been propped up over centuries by those with a direct interest in its 
continued existence, with the willing assistance of many, causing harm to an untold 
number.12 The continued existence of this wall is a blight on every society which 
tolerates it. Until this wall is crushed, vulnerable members of society will continue to 
be just that: vulnerable members of society. The complicity of institutions ensures 
that. 
 
We need to break down the wall of institutional complicity and punish enablers and 
bystanders who protect both the institution and perpetrator. Doing so requires 
recognizing there are two crimes occurring simultaneously, symbiotic in a sense: the 
actor’s crime of commission and the bystander’s-enabler’s crime of omission. Until we 
recognize the power of the crime of omission, survivors will confront preparators 
who are emboldened by institutions and protected by enablers and bystanders. The 
time has come to say, “enough is enough.”  
 
10 Amos N. Guiora, Armies of Enablers: Survivor Stories of Complicity and Betrayal in Sexual Assaults, American Bar 
Association, 33-51 (2020). 
11 Amos N. Guiora, The Crime of Complicity: The Bystander in the Holocaust, American Bar Association, 105-139 
(2020). 
12 Some would argue that the #MeToo movement is the result of sexual assault allegations not being taken seriously 
in formal channels, thus the desire to bring accusations in informal channels. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 
94 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1146, 1167-1174 (2019). 
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The triangle of institutional complicity-enablers-bystanders has a stranglehold on 
the person in peril.13 That needs to be countered; to that end, this article proposes 
criminalizing omission as an essential tool in that critical effort. It does not focus on 
the actions of the perpetrator. That we leave to others. Rather it focuses on the 
actor whose omission enables the perpetrator. That actor is the enabler: the person 
who knew or should have known of the perpetrators conduct. The conduct of the 
enabler is particularly acute when the crimes are committed in an institutional 
setting. The person in peril almost always knows the enabler and have the 
expectation, presumptively reasonable, that the enabler will chose to protect them 
rather than the institution.  
 
However, as we shall come to see—in example after example—it is the institution 
that is protected rather than the person in peril. In recommending the criminalization 
of the enabler, we seek to rearticulate the relationship between enabler-
perpetrator-survivor-institution. This is an unacceptable failing in the law. Rather 
than protecting an individual, jurisprudence tolerates protecting the institution. We 
aim to convince the reader that this historical model must no longer be tolerated 
given the harm it has overwhelmingly caused. It is a lacuna that must be decisively 
addressed. 
 
Accordingly, the article will be organized as follows: Section I: Preface; Section II: 
Introduction; Section III: Who Deserves Protection; Section IV: History and Philosophy 
of the Crime of Omission; Section V: Bystanders and Enablers; Section VI: Examples 
of Harm Caused by Institutional Complicity and Enablers; Section VII: Criminalizing 
the Enabler; Section VIII: A Path Forward. 
III. Who Deserves Protection? 
The criminalization of enablers and bystanders reflects recognition that failure to 
aggressively prosecute those who failed to act ensures that perpetrators will 
continue to act with impunity and immunity. That is the direct consequence of failing 
to act on behalf of survivors. However, the issue goes beyond the particular 
survivor, for the broader question cuts to the heart of what society is and to whom 
does it owe a duty. In advocating criminalization of bystanders and enablers, the 
underlying premise is that enablers and bystanders owe a duty to the person in 
peril. 
 
13 Bryan R. Blackmore, Sexual Assault Prevention: Reframing the Coast Guard Perspective to Address the Lowest Level of 
the Sexual Violence Continuum—Sexual Harassment, 221 MILLR 75, 105 (2014). 
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For some, this is an untenable proposition, suggesting a significant, unwarranted 
expansion of the social contract by imposing a duty to act when another is in peril 
at the hands of someone other than the bystander or enabler. 
Restated: Why penalize an individual who did not cause the harm and bears no 
direct responsibility for injury to another? Recommending expansion of the social 
contract causes discomfort for some, reflecting an unnecessary expansiveness of 
prosecutorial power and government overstep that may portend unintended 
consequences. The deep discomfort with criminalizing omission fails to understand 
the benefit to the individual in need. Moreover, in an institutional setting, the 
hesitation to criminalize enablers-bystanders who choose to protect an institution 
reflects prioritizing the needs of the institution over the needs of the individual.  
At its essence, that reflects the complicity that has caused extraordinary harm to 
those attacked by the perpetrator who benefits from the protection afforded by 
the bystander-enabler. The combination of crime of commission and crime of 
omission leaves the survivor injured on two distinct levels: physically by the 
perpetrator and emotionally-psychologically by the bystander-enabler.  
When considered through the lens of the survivor—the means by which bystander-
enabler omission is most persuasively examined—these powerful words carry 
significant weight. The wall that protects the perpetrator directly, and the institution 
indirectly, ensures the abandonment of the person in peril. From a metaphorical 
perspective, that person is akin to the “wretched refuse” that Emma Lazarus 
referenced in her sonnet, “The New Colossus.”14 In considering the plight of “the 
homeless, tempest-tossed to me,” we can, by analogy, consider victims of priests 
who were enabled by their fellow priests and Church hierarchy who ensured, by 
their complicity; the plight of their victims, “yearning to breathe free.” That same 
powerful analogy applies to Larry Nassar’s victims at MSU and USA Gymnastics,15 
Richard Strauss’s victims at Ohio State University,16 and Robert Anderson’s victims at 
the University of Michigan.17 As distressing as that is, far more disconcerting is the 
 
14 Walt Hunter, The Story Behind the Poem on the Statue of Liberty, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 16 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/the-story-behind-the-poem-on-the-statue-of-
liberty/550553/. 
15 Heather Udowitch, The Larry Nassar Nightmare: Athletic Organizational Failures to Address Sexual Assault 
Allegations and a Call for Corrective Action, 16 DePaul J. Sports L. 93, 95 (2020). 
16 Strauss abused over 177 male students between the years of 1979 and 1996. The University had knowledge of 
allegations in 1979. Rick Maese, Ohio State team doctor sexually abused 177 students over decades, report finds, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (May 17, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/05/17/ohio-state-team-doctor-
sexually-abused-students-over-decades-report-finds/. 
17 Like Larry Nassar, Robert Anderson escaped liability for digitally penetrating athletes under the guise of medical 
treatment for decades as he served as a doctor at the University of Michigan. Justin Tinsley, Jon Vaughn and the cost 
of being a Michigan Man, THE UNDEFEATED (July 24, 2020), https://theundefeated.com/features/jon-vaughn-and-the-
cost-of-being-a-michigan-man/. 
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reality that we do not know how many other survivors met the test of “your tired, 
your poor.” 
Which raises the question who—and what—deserves protection? The seemingly 
obvious answer is the individual in peril whose distress is amplified by the failure of 
a bystander or enabler to act on their behalf. The immediate beneficiary is the 
criminal guilty of a crime of commission. The additional beneficiary, in an 
institutional setting, is the institution benefitting from the bystander-enabler decision 
to protect the organization rather than the at-risk individual. This, then, is a stark 
paradigm: protect the individual or protect the criminal and, when relevant, the 
institution. 
There is, from the survivor’s perspective, no gray area. This is not akin to a question 
that justifies finesse and nuance; this is, quite the opposite, a question of two starkly 
contrasting answers: protect me or protect the assailant and institution.18 In 
examining the question from the perspective of the person in peril, the answer is 
obvious, for the ramifications of nonintervention are potentially devastating. 
Minimizing the consequences of the bystander-enabler decision ensures that the 
trauma of betrayal after the trauma of abuse continues unabated. From the 
survivor’s perspective, the pain of the attack is reinforced by the pain of the 
abandonment by the bystander-enabler. 
The word “abandonment” is intended to represent both physical and emotional 
abandonment by the bystander-enabler from the survivor’s perspective. On the 
premise that society’s primary duty is owed to the vulnerable and weak, directly 
countering this abandonment is essential, otherwise the harm caused will be 
significantly magnified. The question is, in its clearest terms, who deserves our 
protection? Efforts to protect require penalizing all actors who directly and 
indirectly contributed to that harm. It is, then, for that reason that criminalizing the 
bystander-enabler is warranted. 
Doing so requires addressing the concerns, if not opposition, to criminalizing 
omission, which has proven a significant roadblock in this effort. Examining omission 
from a historical-philosophical-theological perspective is intended to frame the issue 
in a broader context; to that, we turn our attention. 
IV. History and Philosophy of the Crime of Omission 
 
The crime of omission is not a new concept; it has been recognized for millennia. In 
one of his writings, the ancient Greek philosopher Plato suggested that prison or 
 
18 Jacobo Dopico Gómez-Aller, Criminal Omissions: A European Perspective, 11 New Crim. L. Rev. 419, 421-22 
(2008). 
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banishment was an appropriate punishment for one who witnessed a crime but did 
nothing to stop it.19 Likewise, the Roman scholar Cicero once wrote, “He who does 
not, when he can, ward off or repel wrong is guilty of injustice . . . what is to be 
thought of him who, so far from repelling, abets the wrong?”20  
 
It is unclear the full extent to which these suggestions were legislated anciently, but 
there are some examples of codification. Ancient Roman law punished homicide 
caused by failure to provide food to another or, for doctors, failure to finish a 
surgery.21 Other punishable offenses included the failure of a slave or solider to 
protect their superiors and the failure of certain family members to protect each 
other.22 Later, under Roman Catholic canon law, St. Thomas Aquinas championed the 
idea that certain omissions could be greater sin thans some commissions, and even 
stated, “non-action is a kind of action.”23 
 
Aside from legal theories, condemnations of the crime of omission have also found 
their way into popular literature; examples include Vera Claythorne knowingly 
allowing a boy to drown in And Then There Were None and Jay Gatsby taking the 
blame for Daisy’s murder of Myrtle rather than reporting to the authorities in The 
Great Gatsby. Both of these characters had something to gain from their omissions, 
but their failure to aid or report is inextricably tied to their fatal character flaws, 
eventually leading to their own deaths.   
 
Most major religions have also upheld the character of those who charitably act to 
aid another, even in the absence of familial or contractual duty. The book of Psalms 
in the Bible states in no uncertain terms, “rescue the weak and the needy; deliver 
them from the hand of the wicked.”24 The quintessential example is Jesus’s parable 
of the Good Samaritan, whose message is clearly that we are all “neighbors” and 
thus have an inherent duty to aid each other regardless of the circumstances.25  
 
Despite all of this, as European jurisprudence matured, it quickly divorced itself from 
the idea of punishing omissions. Indeed, St. Thomas was also among the first to 
champion the idea that liability for omissions could only be found if there was a 
duty to act; his thoughts on punishing certain omissions more severely than some 
 
19 Plato, The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with Analyses and Introductions, translated by B. Jowett, M.A. in 
Five Volumes. 3rd edition revised and corrected, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (1892). 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/769. 
20 Marcus Tullius Cicero, Cicero De Officiis, translated with an Introduction and Notes by Andrew P. Peabody, BOSTON: 
LITTLE, BROWN, AND CO., (1887), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/542. 
21 Otto Kirchheimer, Criminal Omissions, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 615, 615 (1942). 
22 Graham Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 Yale L.J. 590, 590 (1958). 
23 Id. at 616 n.8. 
24 Psalms 82: 4. 
25 Luke 10: 29-37. 
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commissions also never gained footing.26 By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
most European jurisdictions had distanced themselves from the idea of punishing 
omissions.  
 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in England. English common law initially 
refused to find liability for omissions. This position was ardently defended, even 
late into the nineteenth century. For example, James Fitzjames Stephen once 
proposed the following hypothetical: “a number of people who stand round a 
shallow pond in which a child is drowning, and let it drown without taking the 
trouble to ascertain the depth of the pond, are, no doubt, shameful cowards, but 
they can hardly be said to have killed the child."27 
 
It was not until the very end of the nineteenth century that English courts, reluctantly, 
began to recognize some exceptions to this baseline rule. One of the first 
exceptions was finding there to be a duty to act when one had voluntarily assumed 
the care of another.28 Critically, that case was one of the first to articulate the oft-
repeated assertion that “it would not be correct to say that every moral obligation 
involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation.”29 The 
Crown Court subsequently carved out more exceptions, creating a duty to act when 
one creates a harmful situation30 or where there was a contractual duty to act.31 
 
American jurisdictions, with their libertarian backgrounds, were more than willing to 
accept the idea that, “there is no legal duty to rescue another in danger, even 
though a moral obligation might exist.”32 Most jurisdictions today only find there to 
be a duty to assist when there exists a special relationship between the victim and 
the bystander. The most commonly recognized example of this is a parent’s duty to 
protect their child.33 Most jurisdictions also find there to be a duty to act when one 
has assumed care of another34 or when one creates the harm inflicted on another.35 
It was not until the murder of Kitty Genovese—explained below—that American 
jurisdictions began to seriously consider creating a general duty to act in all 
situations, and then only if the bystander witnessed the peril personally.  
 
 
26 Kirchheimer at 616. 
27 James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 10 (1883). 
28 R v Instan, (1893) 1 QB 450. 
29 Id. at 454. 
30 R v Miller, (1982) UKHL 6. 
31 R v Pittwood, (1902) TLR 37. 
32 Peter M. Agulnick, Criminal Liability for Failure to Rescue: A Brief Survey of French and American Law, 8 Touro Int'l L. 
Rev. 93, 95 (1998). 
33 Id. at 99. 
34 Id. at 103. 
35 Id. at 102-103. 
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These holdings, ancient and modern alike, are more than a little disturbing when 
framed in the questions of who society seeks to protect. While the crimes of 
commission are familiar and readily understood, the crime of omission raises 
significant concerns. The failure to consistently incorporate crimes of omission in 
criminal codes ensures those who could have acted to protect the person in peril 
evade legal accountability. Professor Arthur Leavens, in refuting the special 
relationship theory for omissions, argued causation should be the ultimate guidance 
when it comes to defining which omissions should be criminalized.36  
 
As outlined below, serious questions need be asked in rebuttal of Stephen’s 
hypothetical about the drowning child. While failing to save a drowning child may 
not seem like traditional murder, is it fair to say that the bystanders in that situation 
are not complicit the child’s death? While the question is posed hypothetically to 
generations of law students, we pose the query from the perspective of the 
individual whose perpetrator acts with confidence that for enablers and bystanders, 
institutional loyalty significantly outweighs any duty to the person in peril.  
 
The historical failure of courts, people of letters, faith leaders, and scholars to 
perceive the dilemma from the perspective of the person in distress has unfortunate 
consequences for the one person most in need of assistance. The continuing—if not 
determined—efforts of institutional actors to turn their backs, for that is the essence 
of complicity, directly led to the crimes committed across US college campuses, 
parish after parish, and where America’s elite gymnasts trained and performed.  
 
As we turn our attention to the question of consequences, addressed in the following 
two sections, it is incumbent upon us to recall that we are examining the question 
before us exclusively through the lens of the person in peril. From their perspective, 
there is no question regarding the painful consequences of bystander-enabler 
complicity, reinforcing the requirement to aggressively prosecute the crime of 
omission, particularly when examined from the perspective of the person in peril. 
V. Bystanders and Enablers 
The proposed definitions for bystanders and enablers are formed by the 
ramifications of their decision not to act on behalf of the person in peril. That 
decision facilitates the perpetrator’s actions; omission must be understood as having 
direct impact on harm that befalls the person in peril. To that end, the two relevant 
terms are defined as follows: 
Bystander: An individual who has direct and personal knowledge of harm faced by 
another person and has the ability to act to minimize that harm. There is no 
 
36 Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 547, 590-91 (1988). 
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expectation the bystander will directly intervene to minimize the harm as the duty to 
act is limited to informing first responders-law enforcement as to the circumstances 
requiring their action or intervention. 
Enabler: An individual who knows, or should know, that another individual has been 
harmed and makes the decision to not act to either minimize harm to that individual 
and/or to other potential victims. The enabler, distinct from the bystander, is not 
present when the harm is caused but fails to act when information regarding harm is 
brought to their attention. 
While there are similarities between the two actors, there is one significant 
difference: the bystander had direct knowledge of harm as they were physically 
present when harm occurred whereas the enabler learned—albeit absent when the 
harm took place—of the harm or was in a position to learn of the harm but chose 
otherwise. The difference between being present when harm occurs as compared to 
learning of the harm is not significant to the person in peril. From their perspective, 
both actors made the decision to ignore their plight and the attendant 
consequences. 
While bystanders were critical to the murders of Sherrice Iverson and Kitty 
Genovese—briefly discussed below—they are distinct from institutional enablers. 
Neither murder reflects institutional complicity or institutional protection. 
Nevertheless, to facilitate discussion of the relationship between bystanders, 
enablers, and institutional complicity, it is incumbent upon us to initially discuss the 
bystander dilemma in its most direct form. Only afterwards can we progress to the 
broader enabler-institutional complicity-omission discussion. We briefly address 
these two murders, the consequences of which resonate decades later, both because 
of their sheer horror and their impact on the bystander discussion. 
A) Bystanders 
The question of imposing a duty to act came under scrutiny in the aftermath of Kitty 
Genovese’s murder in New York City in 1964. Perhaps no murder has galvanized 
the bystander discussion as much as Genovese’s.37 While initial reports of the 
incident were later found to be misleading,38 the fact remains Genovese could have 
been aided, and her death likely could have been prevented, if those who heard 
 
37 A New Look at the Killing of Kitty Genovese: The Science of False Confessions, ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL 
SCIENCE (June 30, 2017), https://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/observer/obsonline/a-new-look-at-the-
killing-of-kitty-genovese-the-science-of-false-confessions.html. 
38 Sam Roberts, Sophia Farrar Dies at 92; Belied Indifference to Kitty Genovese Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/nyregion/sophia-farrar-dead.html. 
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her cries for help had done something as opposed to nothing. The story goes as 
follows: 
Kitty Genovese was returning from work home at around 2:30 a.m. on 
March 13, 1964, when she was approached by a man with a knife. 
Genovese ran toward her apartment building front door, and the man 
grabbed her and stabbed her while she screamed. A neighbor, Robert 
Mozer, yelled out his window, “Let that girl alone!” causing the attacker 
to flee. Genovese, seriously injured, crawled to the rear of her 
apartment building, out of the view of any possible witnesses. Ten 
minutes later, her attacker returned, stabbed her, raped her and stole 
her money. She was found by neighbor Sophia Farrar, who screamed 
for someone to call the police. Police arrived several minutes later. 
Genovese died in the ambulance on the way to the hospital.39 
The other case that has garnered significant attention regarding the bystander is 
that of David Cash, who witnessed his friend, Jeremy Strohmeyer, assault seven-
year-old girl Sherice Iverson in a bathroom stall.40 Cash did not intervene and left 
the bathroom. When his friend emerged, he candidly told Cash he had raped, 
strangled, and murdered the girl. Cash took no action and did not contact the 
police. He faced no charges for his failure to save Iverson or hold his friend 
accountable. What is all the most disturbing about Cash is the flippant way in which 
he denied any responsibility for Iverson’s death. In his own words, “I’m not going to 
get upset over somebody else’s life. I just worry about myself first.”41  
While it is true that many individuals will “do the right thing,” lack of bystander 
legislation allows individuals like David Cash to go unpunished. Cash is a classic 
bystander, positioned to protect a defenseless seven-year-old child, yet choosing to 
protect his friend. While there are countless other examples of individuals in a 
position to intervene on behalf of an individual in peril, only these two cases are 
highlighted because our primary focus is on enablers in an institutional setting. 
However, in order to most effectively make that argument, it is necessary to 
temporarily digress and explain the individual bystander (rather than the 
institutional enabler) and bystander legislation that has been enacted in the past 
decades. 
 
39 Kitty Genovese, HISTORY.COM (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/crime/kitty-genovese. 
40 Don Terry, Mother Rages Against Indifference, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 1998), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/24/us/mother-rages-against-indifference.html 
41 Id. 
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Ten states42 and twenty-eight countries43 have enacted bystander laws. Generally, 
these laws place a duty on the bystander to aid another individual in serious peril. 
Assistance does not extend beyond calling the police/first responders, thereby not 
imposing the requirement to physically intervene. The underlying rationale for 
bystander legislation is to impose a limited duty when the bystander has knowledge 
of the peril and has the capability to act; the knowledge is limited to situations 
where the bystander is physically present and sees the peril. The intention, with 
respect to the legislation, is to criminalize the bystander who does not act, but it 
does so in a limited context. That limitation similarly applies to the act required of 
the bystander. 
In Utah, where bystander legislation has been introduced by State Representative 
Brian King, the crime is defined as a Class B misdemeanor, which imposes either 6 
months imprisonment and/or a $1,500 fine. Opposition to bystander legislation 
largely focuses on 5 distinct arguments: the measure would overwhelm the existing 
911 systems; there would be a significant increase in civil suits; abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion, particularly regarding minority communities; the measure 
reflects undue government intervention; legislation is unnecessary as most people 
will just do the right thing.44 
A caveat is in order: the duty to report to law enforcement exists in many 
jurisdictions regarding both children and the elderly; however, those same 
jurisdictions do not expand that duty to individuals who do not fall into those two 
specific categories. That is, while some jurisdictions penalize failure to report on 
behalf of children and the elderly, that same obligation is not extended to members 
of society not considered “vulnerable.” Legislators, jurists, Libertarians, civil rights 
organizations, certain faith leaders, and members of the broader community 
express opposition to expanding that duty beyond those two categories in large 
part reflecting opposition to the crime of omission, criminalizing an individual who 
did not create the harm suffered by the victim.45 However, from the perspective of 
the person in peril, the moment a bystander comes upon the person in distress, they 
become inexorably linked to the victim’s fate, whether inadvertently or not. 
Professor Patricia Smith captured this point: 
 
42 These states include California, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. 
43 These countries include Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Switzerland, and Tunisia. 
44 Amos N. Guiora and Jessie E. Dyer, Bystander Legislation: He Ain't Heavy, He's My Brother, 29-SPG Kan. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol'y 291, 310-315 (2020). 
45 Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of Expanding Criminal 
Omission Liability, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 385, 432-33 (1998). 
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It is not true that the bystander is not in control of the situation he 
witnesses. If it is correct to say that he let it happen, then he had control 
over preventing the outcome. It is not true that the bystander, who lets 
something happen, is not a sufficient condition for the outcome; at least, 
like the actor, he is a necessary element in a sufficient set.46 
Professor Smith makes a compelling argument, suggesting the bystander not be 
viewed as a passive actor but rather someone positioned to act on behalf of the 
person in peril. While the bystander did not cause the harm, they did not take steps 
to mitigate on the provision that acting would not cause them harm. That rationale is 
at the basis of recommending criminalizing the bystander who chose not to act; it 
would, without doubt, be applied to David Cash and those who heard—regardless 
of the factual dispute—Kitty Genevese’s cries for help. Careful examination of both 
cases, and others, compellingly suggest that the bystander’s failure to intervene 
significantly contributed to further harm. That is the essence of the bystander; the 
individual who saw the peril and could have acted and chose not to. From the 
perspective of Kitty Genevese and Sherrice Iverson, their fate was sealed when 
their (the pronoun is deliberate) bystanders chose to, literally, turn and walk away.  
Criminalizing the bystander would serve two important purposes: it would impose a 
criminal sentence on people like David Cash and deter others from similar behavior. 
That is distinct from the institutional enabler to whom we now direct our attention. 
The two terms—bystander and enabler—have both differences and similarities: the 
most significant difference being the question of presence and knowledge. In the 
Genevese and Iverson cases, bystanders had direct knowledge of the peril and had 
the ability to act without harm to themselves, particularly Cash.47  
That is distinct from the enabler, as defined above, who was not present at the time 
of peril but knew or should have known and failed to act. In the same manner that 
criminalizing bystanders is essential in an effort to protect individuals in peril, that 
same jurisprudential-philosophical approach is applicable to the enablers. In other 
words, can guilt be attached to an actor not present when harm occurs but who, 
nevertheless, should have acted when informed of the peril and chose not to 
provide assistance either to the specific individual or others who would be harmed, 
based on a consistent pattern by the perpetrator? The institutional enablers we 
discuss below made the conscious decision to protect the institution rather than the 
person in peril; their loyalty extended exclusively to the institution. 
 
46 Patricia Smith, Legal Liability and Criminal Omissions, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 69, 98 (2001). 
47 Discussion has also developed regarding bystanders who witness crimes online, or “Digital Samaritans.” See 
Andrea Cipriano, Digital Samaritans: Do Witnesses of Online Crimes Have a Duty to Intervene? THE CRIME REPORT (Jan. 
19, 2021), https://thecrimereport.org/2021/01/19/digital-samaritans-do-witnesses-of-online-crimes-have-a-duty-
to-intervene/.  
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B) Enablers 
The enabler is distinct from the bystander in that the actor was not present at the 
time of peril but knew or should have known and failed to act. The same 
jurisprudential-philosophical approach at that core of criminalizing bystanders is 
applicable to criminalizing enablers. In other words, guilt can be attached to an 
actor not present when harm occurs but who, nevertheless, should have acted when 
informed of the peril, or should have known of the peril, yet chose not to provide 
assistance to the person in peril. The institutional enablers we discuss in the next 
section made the conscious decision to protect the institution rather than the person 
in peril; their loyalty extended exclusively to the institution. The relationship, as 
discussed below, between the enabler and the institution ensures complicity in the 
harm to the person most demanding protection from the perpetrator.  
Numerous theories abound as to the motivation of the institutional enabler, including 
loyalty-identification to the institution; fear of economic repercussion; dislike of the 
person in peril; personal characteristics that impact-prevent acting forcefully; failure 
to recognize peril posed, whether based on a misunderstanding, misread, or 
deliberate obfuscation; perceived (actual or real) understanding regarding 
corporate-institutional loyalty demands; preference for conflict aversion; or a 
combination of the above and/or other considerations.48 Regardless of which 
motivations are applicable, the consequence is that the perpetrator acts knowing 
that those who could act to prevent the crime will not do so. More egregious than 
that, the person in peril comes to recognize that protection will not be offered by 
those positioned to do so. Absent a case where the enabler would be in harm’s 
way, were they to act counter to the perceived institutional benefit, there is no 
justification that can withstand legislative, prosecutorial, or judicial scrutiny.  
Those instances must be understood to be outliers; in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, harm would not have befallen enablers had they chosen to protect the 
individual in peril rather than the institution. In those cases, were they able to 
compellingly demonstrate their position of peril, criminal sanction would not be 
imposed. Absent those unique circumstances there is no justification—from the 
perspective of the person in peril—to tolerating enabler inaction. To fully 
appreciate the consequences of enabler action, the examples below from the 
Catholic Church and Michigan State University must be understood from the 
perspective of the person injured by the enabler. While the enabler did not directly 
 
48 Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 
Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 15-20 (1993). 
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cause harm to the survivor, their inaction indirectly caused harm;49 for that reason, 
omission, like commission, must be criminalized. 
       VI.  Examples of Harm Caused by Institutional Complicity and Enablers 
We initially focus on Cardinal Bernard Law, archbishop of Boston from 1984 until 
his resignation in 2002.50 For the crimes he enabled, the actions he tolerated, and 
the abuses he ignored, Cardinal Law has been referred to as the “godfather” of 
sexual crimes against children in the Catholic Church.51 Had laws criminalizing 
enablers been in effect, it is all but certain that he would have been prosecuted. But 
in fact, he never faced criminal charges. Tragically, the same is true of the other 
enablers discussed here, including some of the biggest, most highly recognized 
names in college athletics. This section will also analyze the systemic rape culture 
among football and basketball players at Michigan State University, fostered by 
former Head Coach Mark Dantonio and Head Coach Tom Izzo, respectively. 
A) Cardinal Law 
Cardinal Law starkly highlights the manner in which enablers bob and weave in 
their conscious effort to protect their institution’s reputation and finances. Many 
enablers identify so powerfully with their institution that they believe they are one 
and the same: a melding that allows no room for anyone, or anything, else. It is 
inevitable then that survivors come in a distant second. This theme defines the 
enabler-survivor relationship and explains why even the most minimal of survivor 
expectations are not met.  
In September 1984, shortly after Law had been installed as archbishop of Boston, 
he received a letter from the aunt of seven young boys who claimed that each boy 
had been abused by Father John Geoghan. Indeed, Law received numerous, similar 
letters informing him of concerns about ongoing abuse by priests under his authority. 
The boys’ aunt was worried Geoghan had not been removed from his ecclesiastical 
role. Rather, he had been transferred from one parish to another, repeatedly 
occupying positions in which he supervised young boys.52  
For a period, Geoghan was placed on “sick leave” and later was provided funds to 
study in Rome. When he returned from Rome, Geoghan declared he was “cured” of 
his attraction to young boys and thereafter reinstated in a leadership role under 
 
49 Woollard, Fiona and Frances Howard-Snyder, "Doing vs. Allowing Harm", THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (May 14, 2002), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/doing-allowing/. 
50 Emanuella Grinberg, Cardinal Bernard Law, symbol of church sex abuse scandal, dead at 86, CNN (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/20/world/former-boston-cardinal-bernard-law-dead/index.html. 
51 Michael Dowd, Michael Dowd: Cardinal should have faced criminal charges, BOSTON HERALD (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://www.bostonherald.com/2017/12/21/michael-dowd-cardinal-should-have-faced-criminal-charges/. 
52 Guiora, Armies of Enablers at 138. 
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Cardinal Law. The letter written to Cardinal Law expressly conveyed Geoghan’s 
history of abusing young boys and the effect the abuse had on the community. The 
cardinal’s response was once again to transfer Geoghan to another parish within 
Boston and inform a parish leader of his history. In Geoghan’s new position, he was 
again assigned to oversee groups of young boys and began preying on several of 
those under his care.53 
Years later, Cardinal Law removed Geoghan from his position and had him sent to 
a program for priest sex offenders. Geoghan was initially labeled a “high-risk 
homosexual pedophile” and subsequently classified as an “atypical pedophile in 
remission.” After just a few months in the program, Geoghan was again assigned to 
join the parish in a leadership role. Predictably, he resumed his abuse of young 
boys.54 Eventually, Cardinal Law removed Geoghan from this position. Geoghan 
was placed on leave and ultimately asked to retire.55 In investigating Cardinal 
Law’s actions, the Massachusetts attorney general stated, “We have an obligation 
to look and see if any criminal statutes apply.” But at the same time, he cautioned 
that criminal law might be ineffective in this case, specifically citing the lack of a 
mandatory reporting requirement for priests.56  
As a result, Law’s decision to protect a priest abusing boys went unpunished. Law’s 
decision cannot be excused, or explained, as happenstance. The opposite is true. 
This was a calculated, deliberate decision to protect the Catholic Church even 
though ample evidence was available regarding the criminal actions of Geoghan. 
From Law’s perspective, it was far easier, safer, and more convenient from the 
Church’s perspective to shift Geoghan to another location. That ensured that the 
Church’s reputation was preserved, both in the eyes of the court of law and the 
court of public opinion.  
The possibility that Geoghan would commit additional crimes does not seem to have 
weighed on Law’s conscience; the sole calculation was how to protect the institution. 
This is classic enabler conduct that, in the context of the Catholic Church, reflects a 
historical pattern that defines the Church’s response to allegations of priest abuse. 
Unfortunately, Law’s misconduct does not exist in isolation. A similar narrative was 
weaved by Cardinal Pell in Australia as made clear by a previously redacted 
report published by the Australia Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to 
 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 139. 
55 Id. 
56 Dowd, Id. 
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Child Sexual Abuse.57 58 This report found that, like Law, Pell was responsible for 
suspicious and erratic transfers from parish to parish of priests about whom 
allegations were made of sexual misconduct. Among other things, these reports 
found that Pell was aware that Father Gerald Ridsdale—against whom multiple 
allegations had previously been made—was taking young boys on camping trips 
alone.59  
Pell, like Law, made decisions reflecting an enabler whose actions protected the 
institution and harmed the vulnerable. Both Pell and Law were in positions of power, 
both were esteemed in their respective communities, entrusted with the welfare of 
members of their faith, particularly vulnerable members. Nevertheless, both made 
the same decision: protect the Church and shuffle priests from parish to parish, 
thereby exposing individuals, particularly children, to predictable future harm, 
which is precisely what occurred to those who had no reason to suspect Law and 
Pell would prefer institutional reputation to personal safety. Both Pell and Law meet 
the test of enablers; unfortunately, absent legislation, neither was prosecuted for 
the crime of enabling. It is hard to imagine two men more fitting to be tagged with 
this criminal offense. 
B) Sports Culture: Dantonio and Izzo 
While there is no doubt regarding the egregiousness of Law’s and Pell’s conduct, 
they are not outliers in the context of institutional enablers. As horrendous as Larry 
Nassar was—one cannot underestimate the evil he perpetrated over decades—to 
explain the culture at Michigan State University solely through the lens of his actions 
is to miss important and disturbing issues that extend well beyond one individual. 
The enabler culture is embedded deeply at Michigan State. The sheer number of 
alleged assaults and the manner in which they were handled strongly suggests a 
systemic pattern that makes it imperative to criminalize the enabler. Otherwise, the 
pattern will continue with no consequences for those who failed survivors. 
Allegations of sexual assault and rape have been made against Michigan State’s 
basketball and football players for years, seemingly without any accountability 
 
57 REPORT OF CASE STUDY NO. 35: Catholic Archdiocese of Melbourne, ROYAL COMMISSION INTO INSTITUTIONAL 
RESPONSES TO CHILD ABUSE (Nov. 2017), 
https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/publications/tabledpapers/9c261d94-a04a-4a81-9350-
99aa3f951269/upload_pdf/un-redacted%20Report%20of%20Case%20Study%20No.%2035%20-
%20Catholic%20Archdiocese%20of%20Melbou....pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. 
58 REPORT OF CASE STUDY NO. 28: Catholic Church authorities in Ballarat, ROYAL COMMISSION INTO INSTITUTIONAL 
RESPONSES TO CHILD ABUSE (Nov. 2017), https://www.childabuseroyalcommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/file-list/un-
redacted_report_of_case_study_28_-_catholic_church_authorities_in_ballarat.pdf. 
59 Id. at 56. 
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demanded of Head Coaches Tom Izzo (basketball) or Mark Dantonio (football).60 
Dantonio once claimed Michigan State is a “safe campus,” a claim so patently 
ridiculous one wonders whether he understood what he was saying. When 
confronted with the rapes committed by three of his players in 2018, he blatantly 
stated this was “new territory.” The following list of allegations through the years 
show that nothing could be farther from the truth: 
1. In 2007 four football players allegedly raped a woman named Ashley 
Dowser. Ashley died by overdose in 2012.61 A diary revealing the details of 
the rape and her subsequent intent to harm herself was found by her brother 
after her death. When the incident was reported to Michigan State University 
police in 2014, a police interview revealed that the four players “ran a 
train” on Ashley. Furthermore, it was suggested that this practice was not 
uncommon among MSU football players.62 Scott Becker, associate director of 
the MSU Counseling Center, inaccurately and inappropriately concluded that 
it was unlikely that Ashley was raped because there were inconsistencies in 
her diary entries. The Ingham County Prosecutor’s Office (ICPO), citing 
Becker’s statement, declined charges.63 
2. In 2009 a gang rape was allegedly committed by a number of Michigan 
State football players. Though the survivor (Jane Doe) filed a police report, 
no charges were filed by the prosecutor. The same year, two additional 
domestic assaults were alleged to have been committed by MSU football 
players against two separate women (Jane Does). In both cases, no charges 
were filed.64 
3. In 2010 a woman (Jane Doe) was allegedly raped by two basketball 
players. The woman and her parents reported the incident to athletic director 
Mark Hollis, who performed his own investigation. Hollis later met with the 
woman’s parents and said that no action could be taken but that if something 
similar were to happen in the future, action would be taken.65 
4. Just a few months later, Carolyn Schaner was allegedly raped by two other 
members of the basketball team. Carolyn went to the hospital the same night 
and reported the incident to police. The University’s General Counsel’s Office 
and upper administration removed the players from their dorm, and 
administrators to rearranged the players’ school schedules in order to keep 
 
60 Dantonio unexpectedly announced his resignation on February 4, 2020. Stephen Douglas, The Timing of Mark 
Dantonio's Resignation is Questionable at Best, THE BIG LEAD (Feb. 4, 2020), https://www.thebiglead.com/posts/mark-
dantonio-resignation-timing-lawsuit-bonus-recruits-01e08xahhvay. 
61 Ashley Elizabeth Dowser - Obituary, DESMOND FUNERAL HOME, 
https://www.desmondfuneralhome.com/obituaries/Ashley-Elizabeth-Dowser?obId=12338556#/obituaryInfo. 
62 An unnamed football player discussed this when questioned by the police. Spartan Silence, ESPN+, 
https://www.espn.com/espnplus/player/_/id/686fee37-06a6-47aa-aa1d-e9ad6e4b783d.  
63 Guiora, Armies of Enablers at 154. 
64 Id. at 154-55. 
65 Id. at 155. 
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them apart from Carolyn. These scheduling changes were not made in 
collaboration with Carolyn nor were the changes even communicated to her. 
Carolyn was told several days after the alleged rape that charges would be 
declined.66 
5. Instead of performing its own Title IX investigation, Michigan State University 
hired an outside law firm to investigate the Schaner incident. When this firm 
had completed its investigation, the team met with Carolyn to deliver its 
findings. Before the meeting, Carolyn was told that she would not be 
permitted to have her counselor with her. During the meeting, Carolyn was 
asked why, when she was being assaulted and raped, she did not choose to 
leave from one of the building’s exits. Finally, she was told that the team 
could not determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the university’s 
policy had been violated.67 
6. In 2013 a rape was reported against an MSU football player, but no 
criminal charges were filed. The same year, another woman was physically 
assaulted by an MSU football player. The victim stated that she only wanted 
an apology. The player apologized, and no criminal charges were filed.68 
7. In 2015 an MSU football player named Keith Mumphery allegedly raped a 
woman. After two investigations, he was found responsible of violating the 
university’s sexual misconduct policy, though no criminal charges were filed.69 
8. Also in 2015, Bailey Kowalski was allegedly raped by three MSU basketball 
players. The MSU Counseling Center discouraged Bailey from reporting 
because she had been “swimming with big fish.” Bailey did file a police 
report in 2019, and the investigation is ongoing.70 
9. In 2017 a woman (Jane Doe) was raped by three Michigan State football 
players, Josh King, Demetric Vance, and Donnie Corley. The MSU Counseling 
Center discouraged the survivor from filing a police report, telling her instead 
to “focus on healing.”71 
This list, as horrendously long as it is, is not even complete. There are doubtless 
many more survivors who chose not to approach law enforcement. What is all the 
more disturbing is the supreme silence which answered the pleas of those women 
with the courage to come forward. This silence seems only to have been broken with 
subtle, or sometimes overt, pleas that the victims keep quiet, lest they tarnish the 
precious reputation of a sports team. 
 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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70 Id. 
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It was Dantonio who violated the trust of the MSU community by allowing, on a 
major college campus, a student—yes, a student who happened to be particularly 
skilled in sports—whose previous behavior was documented and known to go 
unpunished. In playing the role of the victim, Dantonio did the unimaginable: he 
knowingly endangered a community and then claimed to have his trust violated. 
That is the epitome of the enabler who purports to take the high road but, in 
essence, creates the atmosphere that tolerated the behavior of his players. 
Tom Izzo is a very successful men’s college basketball coach. Like him or dislike him, 
he wins big.72 He has been richly rewarded by Michigan State University with 
countless awards and accolades and was elected to the extremely prestigious 
Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame. By all accounts, Izzo is one of the most 
respected members of the coaching fraternity. A number of NBA teams have 
expressed great interest in hiring him, but he has rebuffed all offers, stating that he 
is a for life.73 
Izzo’s players, however, as we have seen, have been involved in numerous off-court 
incidents, primarily violence against women, including sexual assaults. These 
episodes suggest a disturbing systemic pattern, but there is an additional aspect to 
them that demands our attention in the context of the enabler. To understand the 
world of big-time college athletics, and our focus in this context on coaches such as 
Dantonio and Izzo, it is important to recognize that these men are, perhaps 
inevitably, “control freaks.” 
Division I sports is big business, and the expectations and demands on the coach are 
profound.74 The stakes are so high, the money so significant, and the pressure so 
relentless that maybe it should not be surprising if coaches commit violations. 
Recruiting is the lifeblood of a major sports program. Coaches will make allowances 
and assume risks with particular individuals who promise great potential, even 
against the advice of colleagues and outside experts.75 
Perhaps the coach assumes that a player’s unwanted behavior will fade away in a 
new environment or hopes that the player will develop some newfound maturity. 
Regardless, coaches will make controversial decisions regarding “at-risk” recruits 
because a potential game-changer, a player who can become a mainstay and help 
 
72 Hall of Famers - Tom Izzo, BASKETBALL HALL OF FAME, https://www.hoophall.com/hall-of-famers/tom-izzo/. 
73 Eamonn Brennan, Tom Izzo, Spartan for 'life,' ESPN (June 15, 2010), 
https://www.espn.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/id/12533/tom-izzo-spartan-for-life. 
74 Rich Exner, Topped by Ohio State, Big Ten sports approaches $2 billion a year in spending, CLEAVLAND.COM (Feb. 
25, 2020), https://www.cleveland.com/osu/2020/02/topped-by-ohio-state-big-ten-sports-approaches-2-billion-a-
year-in-spending.html. 
75 Jeremy Crabtree, Playing the bad guy, ESPN (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/recruiting/football/story/_/id/12249013/coaches-go-art-negative-recruiting. 
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a program make the leap into top tier level, is justifiable from a cost-benefit 
perspective.76 
Most fans care only about wins and losses. That fact encourages the toleration of 
unacceptable behavior if it does not fully morph into the criminal. Football coaches 
may lament the practicality of monitoring everyone on their teams of 100 or more, 
but that argument cannot be used on basketball teams, whose members number 
between 15 and 20. Coaches, in fact, invest significant time, resources, and energy 
in ensuring that their players maintain adequate GPAs and stay out of trouble so 
that they are not suspended.77 
The list of Michigan State basketball players who have committed crimes, are 
alleged to have committed crimes, or have been investigated on suspicion of 
committing crimes is long and disturbing. We need to ask whether Izzo demanded 
accountability from his players, suspended them in the face of serious allegations, 
and concretely addressed their misbehavior. 
The numbers, and the cases detailed above, suggest Izzo was willing to accept 
behavior that resulted in direct harm to Michigan State’s students. His failure to 
aggressively, publicly, and consistently address these acts over several years 
cannot be ignored. Izzo is the head basketball coach, but he is also a university 
employee. As such, he has a duty of care to all MSU students, no less the victims 
mentioned above than his players. 
Tom Izzo and Mark Dantonio must be recognized as enablers. Both men actively 
developed deep coach-player relationships and then turned a blind eye when said 
players were under serious suspicion of heinous crimes. They sought to protect the 
team at the expense of vulnerable young people to whom they owed an equal 
duty of care. The successes enjoyed by Izzo and Dantonio, and the renown they 
have brought the university, cannot be used to wave away the disturbing conduct of 
their athletes. 
The desire to win, protect an institution, and achieve corporate or political success is 
understandable. But at some point, a line is crossed. Mark Dantonio, Tom Izzo, 
innumerable administrators, coaches, presidents, cardinals, CEOs, and others in 
positions of power made the decision to enable the wrongdoer, thereby creating 
harm for others. It is for that reason that criminalizing the enabler is vitally 
 
76 Pat Forde and Pete Thamel, Federal documents detail sweeping potential NCAA violations involving high-profile 
players, schools, YAHOO! SPORTS (Feb. 26, 2018), https://sports.yahoo.com/exclusive-federal-documents-detail-
sweeping-potential-ncaa-violations-involving-high-profile-players-schools-103338484.html. 
77 Cindy Miller Aron, Mind, Body and Sport: The haunting legacy of abuse, NCAA (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.ncaa.org/sport-science-institute/introduction-mind-body-and-sport. 
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important, for otherwise not only will a specific enabler go unpunished, but there 
will be no deterrence for future enablers. 
With that, we turn our attention to the mechanism for criminalizing the enabler. 
Failure to aggressively pursue this course ensures the existing lacuna goes 
unaddressed and that harms caused by predators enabled by Law, Pell, Izzo, and 
Dantonio will repeat themselves at similar institutions. 
However, before doing so we need to pause and address the question of “carrot or 
stick”? While this article makes the argument criminalizing the enabler is needed 
both to deter others and to punish the wrongdoer, others suggest that is a step too 
far, suggesting education efforts are sufficient in addressing the enablers. That 
argument is premised on the argument that criminalizing is “over-kill” and imposing 
a criminal record on an enabler does not reflect the intent or spirit of the criminal 
law. The argument reflects concern, perhaps justifiable, with unnecessarily “tagging” 
an individual as a criminal when, so goes the argument, the act is one of omission.  
The deterrence-punishment argument is at the core of criminal law jurisprudence 
and philosophy. The discourse regarding the effectiveness and intent of deterrence 
and punishment has been discussed widely.78 The discussion whether to criminalize 
the enabler depends on from which perspective is the question posed. When 
viewed, as argued in this article, from the perspective of the person in peril, the 
answer is obvious. That is the position advocated in these pages. However, when 
viewed from the perspective of the enabler specifically, and broader society in 
general alarm bells are raised regarding over-reach.79 
The “over-reach” argument suggests a more measured, perhaps moderate 
approach to the dilemma. Advocates for this approach believe that legislative 
over-reach can have unintended consequences running the gamut from prosecutorial 
over-reach to law enforcement targeting of minority communities to misallocation of 
government resources to exaggeration the threat posed by enablers. The 
suggestion, then, is that the problem is manageable, perhaps not as profound as 
suggested in these pages. 
The most appropriate response to the efforts to minimize the harm posed by the 
enabler was articulated by Tiffany Thomas-Lopez.80 Ms. Thomas-Lopez was 
assaulted by Larry Nassar over 150 times while she was a student-athlete at 
Michigan State University. When she physically demonstrated what Nassar was 
 
78  
79  
80  
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doing to Lianna Haden,81 a MSU trainer, Ms. Hadden expressed shock and dismay. 
However, rather than take decisive action intended to protect Ms. Thomas-Lopez, 
Ms. Hadden merely suggested Tiffany speak with Destiny Teachnor Hauk, the MSU 
Head Trainer.82  Ms. Teachnor-Hauk, rather than take decisive actions intended to 
protect Ms. Thomas-Lopez chose the opposite course. In conjunction with the Head 
Softball coach, Ms. Jacquie Joseph, 83, Ms. Teachnor-Hauk moved to have Ms. 
Thomas-Lopez removed from the softball team. The three---Hadden, Teachnor-
Hauk, and Joseph---made the deliberate decision to ignore the peril of the survivor 
and enabled the crimes committed by Larry Nassar. 
Regardless of their motivations, the consequence from Ms. Thomas-Lopez’s 
perspective reflected the double trauma survivors confront when abandoned by 
enablers. Not only was Ms. Thomas-Lopez violated over 150 times but when she 
reported the crimes to those she trusted, empowered to protect, her all three made 
the decision to protect Nassar and Michigan State. From the perspective of the 
survivors’ the refusal to criminalize the enabler ensures that what happened to Ms. 
Thomas-Lopez will invariably repeat itself. Rejection of the criminalization proposal, 
reverting to a “carrot”-education paradigm ultimately fails to do what is most 
essential: protect the vulnerable. 
Nevertheless, we should not be dismissive of efforts to educate. However, such 
efforts, were they to be implemented, must be undertaken in conjunction with 
implementation of the criminal process. It is “fool’s gold” to assume that educational 
efforts, regardless of their sincerity and desire, can compel enablers to act on 
behalf of the survivors. As we have discussed throughout this article, protection of 
the survivor is at the core of this undertaking. With that we turn to the proposed 
methodologies to criminalize the enabler.  
 
 
VII. Criminalizing the Enabler 
 
The phrase “talk is cheap” comes to mind for those who agree sexual assault 
enabling is reprehensible, but do not agree with criminalizing the enabler. Because 
our primary motivation is to create a mechanism protecting the vulnerable from 
perpetrator and enabler alike, we present in this section a road map for 
criminalizing the enabler. In the previous section we examined the direct 
 
81  
82  
83  
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consequences of the historical hesitation to recognize omission as equating 
commission. That approach, while rooted in a particular jurisprudential philosophy, 
exacerbates the harm of the person in peril. To view harm through the narrow lens 
of commission, rather than through combination of omission and commission, benefits 
two actors: the perpetrator (directly) and the enabler (indirectly); the former 
because they are unencumbered in committing their crime, the latter because they 
will not be held responsible for their decision. The protection of the institution is the 
ultimate result. 
 
Some may argue that existing legislation—particularly mandatory reporting 
laws—are sufficient. There are many reasons why this is incorrect as explained in 
the following two sections. 
 
A) Inadequacy of Mandatory Reporting Legislation 
 
Every state in the country has adopted some type of “duty to report” or mandatory 
reporting law. These laws generally require an adult, who is in some special 
position, to report child abuse to law enforcement as soon as they suspect it is 
occurring. 
 
While mandatory reporting laws are undeniably a step in the right direction, all 
mandatory reporting laws lack all the necessary elements to make them truly 
effective. Indeed, all states have pieces of the puzzle but lack every necessary 
element to effectively criminalize sexual assault enabling. These elements will be 
considered in turn: 
 
i. Who is required to report? 
 
A few states extend liability for mandatory reporting to all individuals, regardless 
of position or status.84 However, a majority of states enumerate those who may be 
held liable to specific individuals in positions of authority.85 The former is the 
preferrable approach.  
 
Any state which enumerates specific positions to be held liable will obviously fall 
short of including a certain place where sexual assault occurs. If this article has 
demonstrated anything, it is that sexual assault can occur anywhere and by anyone. 
It occurs at the most revered universities and the holiest of cathedrals. Nowhere is 
 
84 See, for example, Utah’s statute states “when any individual . . . has reason to believe that a child has been 
subjected to abuse or neglect . . . that individual shall immediately report the alleged abuse or neglect." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (West 2020); See also TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 261.101 (West 2019). 
85 The Massachusetts statute lists forty-seven positions. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 21. The Washington statute lists 
nineteen positions. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030. 
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exempt, and thus, no one should be exempt. Failing to include all persons in a 
mandatory reporting statute ignores the—unfortunate—omnipresence of sexual 
assault. 
 
ii. Who is protected? 
 
Almost every state restricts mandatory reporting protections to require reporting for 
the assault of children.86 Only a handful of outliers require reporting for all victims 
when rape and/or abuse is suspected, and even then, only medical practitioners 
are required to make such a report.87  
 
Here, again, such a restriction is shortsighted and ignores the reality that all 
members of society are susceptible to sexual assault and abuse. This also ignores 
the well-acknowledged effects which sexual assault can have on an individual’s 
ability to protect themselves from sexual predators. While the desire to protect the 
most vulnerable first is understandable, such a restriction simply provides a window 
for enablers to reside in if a victim they prey on is a competent adult. All states 
should extend reporting protections to all individuals. 
 
iii. When must a report be made? 
 
Virtually every state requires immediate reporting to a law enforcement agency or 
abuse hotline.88 A few states allow a buffer zone of several days before a report 
must be made.89 Given the seriousness of abuse and the continuing danger to the 
victim, immediate reporting is ideal. 
 
iv. Who is exempt? 
 
Nearly every state recognizes some necessary exceptions for certain types of 
privileges.90 While such privileges may be desirable, the ideal duty-to-report 
statute will include as few exceptions as possible or rescind all privileges.91 
 
 
86 Texas’s statute requires reporting when one has “cause to believe that a child’s physical or mental health or 
welfare has been adversely affected by abuse or neglect.” Tex. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 261.101(a) (West 2019). 
87 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12A ½; CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160. 
88 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.17.020 (West). 
89 For example, the California mandatory reporting statues requires a report to be made within thirty-six hours of 
learning about the abuse. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166 (West 2020). Michigan’s statute requires reporting within 
seventy-two hours. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.623 (2020). 
90 Michigan’s statute recognizes exceptions for the attorney-client privilege and the clergy-parishioner privilege for 
statements made in a confessional setting. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.631. 
91 Wyoming’s statute, for example, recognizes no exceptions for mandatory reporting, even for the attorney-client 
privilege. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210. The costs and benefits of a statute such as this is an analysis which cannot be 
full addressed here. 
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v. What is the degree of criminality? 
 
Most states punish a failure to report as a misdemeanor. A minority of states assign 
only a fine, usually between $500 to $1,000, for violations.92 All states should 
punish failure to report as a misdemeanor punishable by at least 6 months in prison 
or a fine of $1,000.93  
 
Most state’s mandatory reporting laws fail when it comes to who is required to 
report and who is protected. By analyzing all these factors, we can come up with a 
“perfect” mandatory reporting law as one that1) requires all adults to report; 2) 
protects all individuals, regardless of age or disability; 3) requires immediate 
reporting; 4) has as few exceptions as possible; and 5) punishes failure to report as 
a misdemeanor requiring at least 6 months in prison or a fine of $1,000. 
 
The phrase “we’re all mandatory reporters” captures the spirit of these proposed 
changes. It is no different from the oft-repeated sentiment in torts that we all have a 
duty to act reasonably to each other, regardless of our differences or conflicts. 
Survivors deserve no less from a modern, civilized society.  
 
B) Inadequacy of Other Options 
 
Aside from mandatory reporting, there are many other types of laws which come 
close to criminalizing enabling behavior yet fall short in one way or another. The 
purpose in reviewing these forms of legislation is twofold. First, it demonstrates how 
currently existing legislation, in a way, embraces the idea of criminalizing omission 
and holding individuals responsible for harms they did not instigate. Second, it 
demonstrates how criminalization of enablers may simply require a different 
interpretation of current legislation as opposed to a new law. 
 
i. Criminal negligence 
 
Criminal negligence, in its most basic terms, is described as “a material forsaking of 
expected concern, vital abandonment of required care, or real divergence of 
appropriate concern” as well as “aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless conduct 
that is such a departure from that of the ordinarily prudent or careful person . . . as 
to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life.”94 It is important to note 
that “criminal negligence” may refer either to an independent crime or to the mens 
rea element of the model penal code.  
 
 
92 Vermont’s statute only requires a $500 fine. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4913. 
93 California follows this approach. 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 243 (A.B. 1963) (West).  
94 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 121. 
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On the surface, this seems to align perfectly with the arguments made in this article: 
criminalize the enablers because their conduct—their omissions—represent a 
substantial and unjustifiable deviance from the ordinary standard of care each 
human being owes to each other. Moreover, the crime of negligence is tied to the 
tort of negligence, which clearly enumerates a general duty of care which all human 
beings owe each other.  
 
Despite this seemingly good fit, most states characterize their criminal negligence 
statutes in terms of commission, especially as related to homicide. There are other 
states, however, whose criminal negligence statues are so broad and ambiguous 
they seem to embrace inclusion of omissions. For example, Louisiana’s statute states, 
“Criminal negligence exists when . . . there is such disregard of the interest of others 
that the offender’s conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of 
care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like 
circumstances.”95 However, in practice, such statutes are enforced exclusively on 
crimes of commission. 
 
In jurisdictions where broad criminal negligence statutes exist, it may be more 
advisable to expand those statues to encompass enabling behavior rather than 
creating a separate statute. 
 
ii. Reckless endangerment 
 
An additional crime which bears some similarities—and important distinctions—with 
the proposed mandatory reporting law is reckless endangerment. In layman’s terms, 
reckless endangerment entails causing another to be put in circumstances which may 
result in death or serious injury. For example, the Utah reckless endangerment 
statute reads, “a person commits reckless endangerment if, under circumstances not 
amounting to a felony offense, the person recklessly engages in conduct that 
creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.”96 
There also exists child endangerment statutes which criminalizes such behavior more 
severely when harm results to a child, although many of these statutes restrict 
liability to the parent or guardian of said child.97 
 
There is an argument that enabling behavior constitutes reckless endangerment. 
According to the Model Penal Code, one acts recklessly when one “consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will 
result from his conduct.”98 For example, to instruct a young girl to be “treated” by a 
 
95 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:12. 
96 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-112. 
97 IOWA CODE § 726.6. 
98 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. 
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physician alone in a hotel room amounts to creating a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that she will sustain serious bodily injury.99  
 
And yet, courts have interpreted reckless endangerment in terms of commission, not 
omission. As such, most reckless endangerment statutes envision more overtly 
malicious acts, for example, deliberately leaving someone alone in a desert and 
driving away.  
 
iii. Accessory after the fact 
 
Many jurisdictions criminalize accessories “after the fact.” In general terms, this 
means aiding or otherwise assisting one who has committed a crime, especially 
when helping them to avoid punishment. For example, the US code criminalizes an 
individual who “receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder 
or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact.”100 
On the surface, this seems to describe the enablers in Section V who could be said 
to have assisted those guilty of sexual abuse. Yet again, in application courts have 
restricted interpretation to actions which involve more overt, physical actions, 
avoiding any application to crimes of omission. 
 
While Cardinal Law, Tom Izzo, and Mark Dantonio may have disproved of sexual 
violence, their willingness to put the institution first, and their subsequent silence, 
allowed rapists and abusers to go unpunished. That is the reality of the culture they 
tolerated, if not created, at the institutions they headed. All three had knowledge of 
criminal actions committed “on their watch,” yet all three made the conscious 
decision to enable such behavior which persisted over the course of years.  
 
Akin to Stephen’s hypothetical: while individuals who watched the child drown are 
not as directly culpable as the one who pushed him in, their silence and inaction 
directly assisted the ultimate result, especially when preventable. Arguably, this 
would legitimize application of the crime of accessory after the fact. Nevertheless, 
courts and prosecutors have refused to apply such an interpretation.  
 
While a different interpretation of these three laws may effectively criminalize 
sexual assault enabling, the recommendation is still the complete mandatory 
reporting law suggested in subsection A. Among other things, mandatory reporting 
laws are more well-known, and thus changes made to one would be more likely to 
be understood by—and effectively conveyed to—the public. Moreover, the 
 
99 This refers to Mattie Larson, an elite gymnast, who was ordered by USA Gymnastic officials to be treated by Larry 
Nassar alone in his hotel room alone; Ms. Larson uses the word “abandoned” to describe what she felt Nassar’s 
enablers, USAG officials, did to her. Guiora at 54. 
100 18 U.S.C. § 3. 
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creation of a new law sends a powerful message that the government will refuse to 
tolerate such heinous behavior. 
 
C) Best Practice for Responding to Sexual Assault Allegations 
 
One of the primary intentions behind the previous recommendation to expand 
mandatory reporting is to break down any barriers between individuals who learn 
of sexual assault and the police. 
 
To that end, we recommend the following two-part process: 1) The person with 
knowledge of sexual assault contacts the police. 2) The reporter contacts institution 
superiors when reasonable to do so.  
 
It is imperative that these steps are taken in that order. If the victim or someone in 
their behalf initially approaches a senior institutional official, history repeatedly 
demonstrates they will hear the five words: “We will handle this internally” or “we’ll 
look into this ourselves.” Those words are devastating for victims. Those words have 
been spoken too many times and have been the source of unending pain to an 
untold number of survivors. While there is the possibility that the institution’s 
superiors will make a speedy report to law enforcement, example after painful 
example has shown that the financial and reputational allure of “keeping things 
quiet” is too irresistible for institutions everywhere.  
 
Hence the recommendation that mandatory reporting laws include a provision that 
reporters should contact the police before anyone else. Some may call such a 
requirement draconian, but countless examples have shown that the risk of 
institutions choosing to protect themselves or brush off complaints as vindictive is far 
too great. The potential detriments of this approach will be examined below.  
 
Ultimately, the end goal of modifying mandatory reporting laws is to create a 
world where all individuals feel an imperative to report sexual assault to law 
enforcement immediately. There is no assumption that this will solve every problem. 
The police themselves may be complicit or otherwise corrupt. It may be that they 
find there is insufficient evidence at that time to move forward with prosecution. 
However, the more people who know abuse may be occurring, the better. The 
police are bound at some point to be more suspicious than someone in the abuser’s 
institution.  
 
If Cardinal Law had went to the police after the Geoghan’s first allegation, it is 
entirely possible Geoghan could have been prosecuted, tried, and sent to prison, 
thus sparing dozens of boys the lifelong scars of sexual abuse. If the first 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3827517
 31 
prosecution failed, at the very least Geoghan would know for a certainty that the 
church would not protect him the next time an allegation was made.  
 
It is imperative to take steps toward creating a society where all individuals, in all 
institutions, feel an imperative to take all allegations seriously and take them to the 
police before anyone else. Such a mentality is simply what survivors deserve in a 
just and equitable society.   
 
D) Arguments and Counterarguments 
 
It is only appropriate to examine this proposed legislation with a critical eye. With 
that in mind, below are listed some of the most common arguments against 
criminalizing enablers and the counterarguments. 
 
Some survivors argue this legislation is potentially harmful to those suffering from 
abuse. For example, a secretary being abused by her boss may be less likely to 
report instances of her boss abusing others out of fear of retaliation in the form of 
more abuse.101 There is a simple solution to this valid concern: provide immunity to 
those who are being abused or who are in reasonable fear of abuse by the same 
abuser. Such a provision would protect victims while continuing to punish individuals 
like Cardinal Law who were under no reasonable fear of abuse to themselves. 
 
In that same vein, there are many, especially in employment situations, who may 
fear retaliation from the hands of the institution for their actions in preventing 
abuse.102 Here, again, a relatively simple solution is to expand and/or reinforce 
whistleblower protections. While many such laws already exist, legislators ought to 
ensure they work effectively and ensure that the public knows they are in place. 
Institutions themselves also ought to create internal policies to ensure their own 
protections for whistleblowers.  
 
Some argue such legislation will result in discriminatory prosecution practices against 
minorities.103 This is indeed a valid concern which needs to be addressed on multiple 
fronts. Prosecution review boards, along with other efforts, can be effective at 
counteracting this concern. 
 
 
101 Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 579, 605-610 (1988). 
102 Cortina, L. M. and Magley, V. J., Raising voice, risking retaliation: Events following interpersonal mistreatment in the 
workplace, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION (2003), 
https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2F1076-8998.8.4.247. 
103 Mical Raz, Unintended Consequences of Expanded Mandatory Reporting Laws, PEDIATRICS PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 18, 
2016), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/139/4/e20163511.full.pdf. 
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Many express concerns that enabler statues such as these will cause people to 
become paranoid. It is easy to imagine someone in Dantonio’s or Izzo’s position 
making mountains out of molehills and attempting to micromanage their athlete’s 
personal lives when they suspect abuse. The counterargument is that the mens rea 
requirement for knowledge of sexual assault can be defined in a sufficiently distinct 
way so as to restrict punishment to instances where abuse is reasonably likely to be 
occurring.  
 
An additional concern is that this legislation will punish people fail to report not out 
of a desire to protect their institution, but simply because they are timid.104 This may 
be true, but, the question, as discussed in this article, is how we most effectively 
protect the person in peril. From the survivor’s perspective, there is no discomfort 
which the enabler could possibly experience which could compare to the years of 
anxiety, fear, nightmares, stress, and often unending pain which can follow even 
one instance of sexual abuse, let alone hundreds. Failing to enact legislation 
criminalizing the enabler ensures perpetrators continue to act with immunity and 
confidence. The continued insistence that criminalizing omission is “one step too 
much” ensures abandonment of the survivor. Failing to criminalize omission reflects a 
willingness, intended or otherwise, to protect the enabler rather than to protect 
individuals from sexual abuse. Such a conclusion is unacceptable. When put on the 
proverbial scales of justice, the needs of the victim far outweigh concerns of the 
enabler.   
 
The persistently repeated argument that such efforts are unnecessary since people 
will usually do the right thing is debunked in example after example. While often 
held up as the primary reason to oppose criminalizing enabler omission,105 it 
reflects abandonment of the person in peril. More than that, the failure to 
criminalize omission represents an unwillingness to recognize that omission has 
consequences and must not be understood otherwise. To argue that omission is 
devoid of ramifications is to ignore the plight of the person directly harmed by a 
powerful combination of the perpetrator and enabler. The melding of commission 
and omission has one result: terrible harm to the person in peril who was attacked 
by the perpetrator and abandoned by the enabler. 
VIII. A Path Forward 
 
We have, in the previous pages, proposed a way forward to leap over a wall 
constructed over centuries and reinforced on a regular basis. That wall protects 
 
104 Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of Expanding Criminal 
Omission Liability, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 385, 432-434 (1998). 
105 Roni Rosenberg, Two Models of “absence of Movement” in Criminal Jurisprudence, 12 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 195, 198-
200 (2014). 
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institutions and perpetrators. It does not require Superman to leap over it. However, 
from the perspective of the person in peril, it must truly seem that the wall which 
protects those seeking to harm them, directly and indirectly, has become their 
Wailing Wall. That is most unfortunate, reflecting a deeply ingrained opposition to 
recognizing that the crime of omission is as consequential as the crime of commission. 
The consistent voices of opposition to criminalizing the omission of bystanders and 
enablers reflect an unwillingness to examine the dilemma from the perspective of 
the person most in need of assistance. This instinctual resistance only serves to 
reinforce the entrenched power of abusers, their institutions, and their enablers. 
 
The power dynamic between institutions, institution protectors, and the person in 
peril is illustrative of an overwhelming power imbalance. If there is something we 
should have learned these past months,106 it is that power imbalances, which define 
much of American society, cause extraordinary harm, whether directly or indirectly. 
Power imbalances cut across many sectors, they cannot be claimed by one group. 
The mantle of imbalance is held, tragically, by many, transferred from generation 
to generation. That has been a disquieting historical reality that is at odds with John 
Winthrop’s “Dreams of a City on a Hill.” 
 
Winthrop penned his words in 1630, before he and his fellow settlers arrived on 
the shores of New England. The hope was that the Massachusetts Bay Colony would 
shine like an example to the world. Whether it met that lofty goal or not is a matter 
of historical perspective, beyond our purview and scope. Nevertheless, his words—
and their powerful, aspirational message—are relevant when considering the duty 
owed to the person in peril in the context of omission: 
 
God Almighty in his most holy and wise providence hath so disposed of 
the condition of mankind, as in all times some must be rich some poor, 
some high and eminent in power and dignity; others mean and in 
subjection. 
The Reason hereof: 
3rd Reason. 
Thirdly, that every man might have need of others, and from hence they 
might be all knit more nearly together in the bonds of brotherly 
affection. From hence it appears plainly that no man is made more 
honorable than another or more wealthy etc., out of any particular and 
singular respect to himself, but for the glory of his Creator and the 
common good of the creature, Man.  
Question: What rule must we observe and walk by in cause of community 
of peril? 
 
106 Time of writing is January 2021. 
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Answer: 
The same as before, but with more enlargement towards others and less 
respect towards ourselves and our own right. Hence it was that in the 
primitive Church they sold all, had all things in common, neither did any 
man say that which he possessed was his own. . . . whereof we keep an 
honorable remembrance of them; and it is to be observed that both in 
Scriptures and latter stories of the churches that such as have been most 
bountiful to the poor saints, especially in those extraordinary times and 
occasions, God hath left them highly commended to posterity.107 
 
We opened with Lazarus’s majestic words and we close with Winthrop’s moving 
aspirational phrases. We can learn much from their respective pens. Lazarus 
references those in despair and what can be done for them; Winthrop addresses 
the duty we owe each other. Examined together in the context of institutional 
complicity and the consequences of bystander-enabler omission, their words ring 
loud on behalf of the person whose voice is not heard. That person is the one 
standing outside the wall, knowing that inside are the actors—commission and 
omission—who have teamed up to cause them harm.  
 
Our failure to legislate the crime of omission ensures continuing harm to those who 
do not have a voice, impacted by a power imbalance that favors the institutions 
and ensures that society continues to turn its back on them. The time has come to 
take to heart Lazarus’s and Winthrop’s words from the perspective of the person in 
peril, harmed by perpetrator and bystander-enabler alike. In the proceeding 
pages, we have provided a road map for how to overcome this historical wrong; 
the time to act is now before what happened at Michigan State, Penn State, USA 
Gymnastics, University of Michigan, and the Catholic Church is perceived as normal.  
 
Survivors deserve better from society. 
 
107 John Winthrop, Dreams of a City on a Hill, THE AMERICAN YAWP READER (1630), 
https://www.americanyawp.com/reader/colliding-cultures/john-winthrop-dreams-of-a-city-on-a-hill-1630/. 
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